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Experimental demonstration of counterfactual quantum key distribution
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Counterfactual quantum key distribution provides natural advantage against the eavesdropping on
the actual signal particles. It can prevent the photon-number-splitting attack when a weak coherent
light source is used for the practical implementation. We realized the counterfactual quantum key
distribution in an unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer of 12.5-km-long quantum channel with
a high-fringe visibility of 96.4%. As a result, we obtained secure keys against the noise-induced
attack (eg. the vacuum attack) and passive photon-number-splitting attack.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides an un-
conditionally secure communication between two remote
parties (Alice and Bob), where the security is guaranteed
by the fundamentals of quantum mechanics [1, 2]. How-
ever, current techniques cannot support to implement
the ideal quantum cryptography experiment as originally
proposed due to the lack of efficient single-photon or en-
tangled photon-pair sources in the near-infrared region.
So far, in practical long-distance fiber-based QKD sys-
tems, weak coherent light sources have been used in-
stead of ideal single photons [3–5]. Intelligent meth-
ods have been invented to prevent the photon-number-
splitting (PNS) attack based on the multi-photon pulse
of the weak coherent light source [6–9]. Among them, the
decoy-state QKD protocol [10–12] could prevent the PNS
attack by statistical security analysis of a large yield of
the photon clicks [13, 14]. On the other hand, quantum
counterfactual effect has been discussed in interaction-
free measurement [15–17] and developed for the quan-
tum computation [18–20]. Recently, an interesting coun-
terfactual QKD protocol was proposed [21] to distribute
secret keys without any secret information-carrier qubits
transmitting in the quantum channel, which can in prin-
ciple prevent the eavesdropper to directly access the en-
tire quantum system of each qubit. For example, secret
key can be established by using the quantum counterfac-
tual effect in a Michelson interferometer between Alice
and Bob. One arm of the interferometer is in Alice’s se-
cure site, and the other arm is used to connect Bob as the
quantum channel. Unlike previous QKD protocols which
generate secret keys by transmitting the signal particles
through the actual quantum channel, the proposed coun-
terfactual QKD generates secret keys in the case that the
photonic qubits only transmit in Alice’s arm but never
travel through the quantum channel to Bob. Interest-
ingly, as a weak coherent light source is used, the quan-
tum counterfactual effect provides a natural advantage to
prevent the PNS attack by avoiding Eve’s access to the
information-carrier photons. Experimental demonstra-
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tion of such a counterfactual QKD requires a stabilized
Michelson interferometer [22].
In this letter, we experimentally demonstrate the coun-
terfactual QKD based on a round-way unbalanced Mach-
Zehnder interferometer with 25 km fiber length difference
between the long and short arms that ensured an effec-
tive 12.5-km-long quantum channel between Alice and
Bob. Possible eavesdropping against the counterfactual
QKD was analyzed. The counterfactual QKD scheme
was implemented with the capability to reveal the vac-
uum attack by monitoring the photon detection distri-
butions. With a high-fringe visibility of 96.4%, we could
obtain secure keys against the passive PNS attack by an
average photon number of 1 per pulse.
The counterfactual QKD system was composed of a
round-way unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer as
shown in Fig. 1. A 1550-nm DFB laser diode (LD) gen-
erated a series of short pulses with the repetition rate of
5 kHz, which were adjusted to horizontal polarization at
the input of the interferometer. The laser pulses were re-
 
FIG. 1: Schematic of the counterfactual QKD system. LD:
1550-nm DFB laser diode; Attn1,2: variable attenuators;
PC1−5: manual polarization controllers; Cir: circulator;
BS1,2: 50:50 beam splitters; PR1,2: polarization rotators;
PM: phase modulator; HR: high-reflection mirror; PBS: po-
larization beam splitter; D1−3: single-photon detectors.
2flected by a high-reflection mirror (HR), and attenuated
to single-photon level before returning the interferometer.
A pulse from the laser source might travel one of the four
paths by the selection of the short arm (s) or long arm
(l) in the forward and backward transmissions, denoted
as (ss), (sl), (ls), and (ll), respectively. We disregarded
the photon paths ll and ss in the counterfactual QKD,
since ll states contained no information, and ss states
were in Alice’s secure station with no information leak.
Only the photons travelling sl and ls paths contributed
to QKD, and the interference was automatically stabi-
lized since photons travelled the fiber paths of exactly
the same length. Four manual polarization controllers
(PC2−5) were adjusted for compensation of the polariza-
tion drifts in the long-distance fiber to make the photons
of sl and ls paths interfere with the same polarizations
at the output of the static interferometer.
The static interferometer was then used to
polarization-encode the qubit in both Alice’s and
Bob’s sites with two polarization rotators (PR1 and
PR2), which were randomly controlled to rotate the
polarization state by either 0◦ or 90◦. In the forward
transmission, Alice randomly modulated the laser pulses
passing the short arm to the horizontal or vertical
polarization direction. Then two possible quantum
states of the photon pulses were prepared as
|ψ0〉 = (|0〉sl|H〉ls + |H〉sl|0〉ls)/
√
2,
|ψ1〉 = (|0〉sl|H〉ls + |V 〉sl|0〉ls)/
√
2,
(1)
where |0〉 is the vacuum state, |H〉 and |V 〉 denote the
horizontal and vertical polarization states, defined as the
bit value of 0 and 1, respectively. In the backward trans-
mission, Bob decoded the polarization states with the
polarization rotator (PR2) and the polarization beam
splitter (PBS) by randomly applying a 90◦ or 0◦ po-
larization rotation on the split pulse in the long arm,
corresponding to the bit value of 0 or 1. If Alice and
Bob chose the same bit value, the split pulse in the long
arm was reflected to the single-photon detector D3 by
the polarization beam splitter. The quantum states |ψ0〉
and |ψ1〉 both collapsed to |V 〉sl|0〉ls or |0〉sl|H〉ls. The
photon travelled either the short arm, which was then
detected by the single-photon detector D1 or D2 with
the same probability of 1/4, or the long arm, which was
then detected by the single-photon detector D3 with the
probability of 1/2. If Alice and Bob chose different bit
values, the split pulse in the long arm passed through
the polarization beam splitter. The quantum state kept
the interference, and the photon pulses went toward the
single-photon detector D1, wherein |ψ0〉 was unchanged,
and |ψ1〉 was transformed to |ψ0〉 since the polarization
of the split pulse in the long arm was rotated by 90◦.
Only the events that D2 alone detected a photon would
create the sifted keys, indicating that Alice and Bob have
certainly chosen the same bit value and the photon pulses
travelled the short arm. If D1 or D3 clicked, Alice and
Bob announced the detected results and their bit values.
The performance of the interference could be calculated
from these events to monitor whether there were any
Eve’s disturbance. We defined (C1, C3, C5) and (C2,
C4, C6) as the counts of the detectors (D1, D3, D2) in
the case that Alice and Bob chose the same and different
bit values, respectively. The count of D2 was randomly
selected from the half of the events that D2 clicked, and
the other half events created the sifted keys. The per-
formance of the interference and polarization extinction
ratio of Alice’s and Bob’s polarization operation could
be respectively characterized by C1 : C2 and C3 : C4,
where C1 : C2 = 1 : 4 represents an ideal interference
[23]). The interference fringe visibility could be calcu-
lated by (4C5−C6)/(4C5 +C6), while the error rate of
the QKD system could be calculated by C5/(C5 + C6).
As Eve had no access to the short arm and the
information-carrier photons, many possible attacks that
threaten the conventional QKD, such as intercept-resent
and Trojan horse attacks, could be successfully pre-
vented [24]. Eve may implement a possible eavesdropping
by using “vacuum attack”, in which Eve operates the
polarization-encoding on the vacuum state before Bob’s
site. Eve’s choice of bit value (BEve) may be the same or
different with Alice’s (BAlice) or Bob’s (BBob). There are
altogether four possible cases. (i) BEve = BAlice = BBob,
Eve may eavesdrop the sifted key with no errors for Al-
ice and Bob. (ii) BEve = BAlice 6= BBob, the quantum
state collapses, while Eve may eavesdrop the sifted key
and induce an error for Bob. (iii) BEve 6= BAlice = BBob,
the photon keeps the interference and is detected by D1.
(iv) BEve 6= BAlice 6= BBob, the quantum state collapses,
while Eve may eavesdrop a sifted key with a possible
error. Three of the four cases may create a sifted key,
wherein Bob and Eve both have the error rate of 1/3 in
the sifted key. According to the Shannon information
theory, the information Eve and Bob get is described as
I = 1 +Dlog2(D) + (1−D)log2(1 −D), (2)
where D is the error rate. Here Eve’s information
through the vacuum attack is only 8.17%, which is much
less than 50% in the conventional QKD through the
intercept-resent attack. Moreover, the vacuum attack
changes the count of D1 and D2, as well as C1 : C2 −→
1 : 2 [23].
The counterfactual cryptography naturally prevents
the PNS attack when a weak coherent light source is
used, because Eve even cannot detect the photon num-
ber of each pulse in the long arm, and she has no access
to the short arm [21]. Passive PNS attack would pro-
vide Eve some information by inserting a beam splitter
in the quantum channel to passively split the photon and
replacing the quantum channel with her lossless channel
to compensate the splitting loss. Eve’s gain of the sifted
key (PEve) is extremely limited because only the joint
event that there is at least one photon in each interfer-
ometer arm is useful in this attack. The proportion of
Eve’s information to the total sifted key is given by
PEve ≤ P (µsl, n > 0) · ηloss, (3)
3where µsl is the mean photon number of the photon
pulse in the long arm, µ is the mean photon number
of |ψ0〉 or |ψ1〉. Here µsl = 0.5 · µ, if the long and short
arms have the same attenuation. P (µ, n) = e−µµn/n! is
the Poissonian distribution for the photon number of n.
ηloss = 1 − 10−0.25Leff/10 is the transmission loss of the
quantum channel from BS2 to PC3, where Leff refers to
the effective distance between Alice and Bob. When the
loss of the quantum channel is so large that ηloss → 1,
Eve could nearly obtain all the information of the photon
in the long arm, and her information gain won’t increase
with the communication distance any more.
According to the Shannon information theory, the se-
cure key can be distilled if Bob obtains more information
than Eve. As shown in Fig. 2, Eve’s maximum gain of
the sifted key was less than 5% for the case µ = 0.1, in-
dependent on the large loss of the long-distance channel.
As a result, the counterfactual QKD protocol provides
an approach to the long-distance secure communication
based on the quantum property instead of the statistical
method such as decoy-state protocols.
In the experiment, the total loss of the long arm was
about 9 dB, while the loss of the short arm was only
3 dB. The photon flux in the long arm was larger than
that in the short arm in the backward transmission, re-
sulting in an increase of Eve’s gain. To eliminate the
threaten induced by the unbalance of the two arms, we
inserted an attenuator (Attn2), and adjusted the total
loss of the short arm to be the same as that of the long
arm. Three home-made near-infrared single-photon de-
tectors were used with the dark-count probabilities of
1.0 × 10−5, 5 × 10−6, 1.5 × 10−5 per pulse, respectively,
at a detection efficiency of 10%. Due to the birefringence
of the single-mode fiber, the photon pulses of ls or sl
path would cover a different phase shift when Alice sent
the horizontal or vertical polarization state. As there was
about 0.4pi phase shift between two orthogonal polariza-
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FIG. 2: Eve’s gain of the sifted key. Dashed and solid lines
show Eve’s gain through passive PNS attack against the coun-
terfactual and PNS attack against conventional QKD, respec-
tively. The olive, black, blue, and red lines denote the mean
photon number of 0.1, 0.5, 1.0, and 5.0, respectively.
0 150 300 450
0
300
600
900
A=1
B=1
A=1
B=0
A=0
B=0
 
Ph
o
to
n
 
co
u
n
t
Time (s)
 D1
 D2
 D3
A=0
B=1
 
FIG. 3: Photon counts of D1, D2 and D3 at various bit value
choice of Alice and Bob with the acquisition time of 15 s.
tion in 12.5 km single-mode fiber, we used a phase mod-
ulator to compensate the polarization-dependent phase
shift. The laser pulses were attenuated to contain 1 pho-
ton per pulse on average. Then we measured the single-
photon interference and the polarization extinction ratio
of the quantum system. As shown in Fig. 3, when Alice
and Bob chose the same or different polarization, the pho-
ton pulses in the long arm were switched to D3, or passed
through the polarization beam splitter to the output of
the interferometer. The photon count of D3 showed a
polarization extinction ratio as high as 30 : 1. The sin-
gle photon interfered at the output of the interferometer
when Alice and Bob chose different polarization. Owing
to the passive phase shift compensation of the round-way
Mach-Zehnder interferometer, the phase shift caused by
the slow variation such as random temperature and stress
drifts were auto-compensated. In this way, we got a sta-
ble interference with the fringe visibility of 96.4%. When
Alice and Bob chose the same polarization, the quantum
state of the signal photons collapsed, and we got almost
the same count rates on D1 and D2.
The experimental demonstration of the counterfactual
QKD was then carried out with the average photon num-
ber µ = 1.0. Alice and Bob used two random number
generators to drive PR1 and PR2 independently. Ta-
ble I presents the experimental results with an acquisi-
tion time of 540 s. The whole system showed an unsur-
passed stability during the acquisition. The counts of
each single-photon detector and the coincidence counts
between D3 and D1 or D2 showed that the photon dis-
tribution experienced no observable changes. The error
rate DAB was 6.7%, mainly from the noise of the in-
terference. Note that the counterfactual QKD requires
a single-photon interference of a high-fringe visibility,
which would have fourfold errors as the conventional
QKD of the same fringe visibility. The interference er-
rors were mainly induced by the polarization operation.
4TABLE I: Experimental results of 12.5-km counterfactual
QKD with the acquisition time of 540 s.
D1 15149
D2 2243
D3 10577
C1 : C2 1 : 4.1
Fringe Visibility 96.4%
Polarization Extinction Ratio 30.5 : 1
Coincidence Probability 0.15%
Sifted key 1121
DAB 6.7%
The polarization extinction ratio was kept at 30.5 : 1 in
the experiment. This error rate opened the back door for
Eve to implement the vacuum attack against 20% of the
vacuum states. However, it would change the counts of
D1 and D2, and C1 : C2 −→ 1 : 3.3 [23]. In the experi-
ment, we got C1 : C2 = 4.1, implying that the error rate
didn’t come from the vacuum attack but was induced by
the intrinsic noise of the QKD system. In this case, Eve
may obtain 20% of the information through the passive
PNS attack, while Bob’s information was 64.5% accord-
ing to Eq. 2. Note that Eve’s information was restricted
under a certain level under this attack (Fig. 2) and was
insensitive to the transmission loss. Since Bob’s infor-
mation was much more than Eve’s, Alice and Bob could
distill the unconditional secure keys at last by the clas-
sical error correction and privacy amplification methods
[2, 25, 26].
In conclusion, we realized the counterfactual QKD ex-
periment in a round-way unbalanced Mach-Zehnder in-
terferometer of 25 km fiber length difference between the
long and short arms that ensured a fiber-based quan-
tum channel of 12.5 km. Despite Bob had an error
rate of 6.7%, we could ensure that there was no noise-
induced attack according to the unchanged count dis-
tribution of each single-photon detectors used in the
QKD system, and secure keys could be obtained against
the passive PNS attack. The key generation rate of
the counterfactual QKD, which was mainly limited by
the slow response time of the polarization rotators used
in our experiment, could be increased with fast po-
larization rotators and high-speed single-photon detec-
tors [27, 28]. And the active polarization compensating
methods have been invented for long-distance fiber-based
QKD experiments[29–31], which were quite useful to re-
alize a long-term stable and long-distance counterfactual
QKD system. The counterfactual QKD scheme was im-
plemented with currently available technologies, promis-
ing a robust and practical quantum cryptography system
toward global secure communication.
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